Cool, overcast, intermittent rain.

 3. OUR OPERATIONS:

a. Infantry:

(1) 1st Bn: One enemy killed attempting to penetrate "A" Co's perimeter night 19-20. Otherwise nil activity. An "A" Co patrol received MG and rifle fire vic­inity (14.4-09.5) and killed at least one enemy before withdrawing to bring artillery to bear. An "A" Co patrol reaching vicinity (15.8-09.5) reported recently made enemy tracks but nil contact. "B" Co returned to Bn CP area in preparation to Bn move towards ridge (14.9-11.9)-(15.5-11.4). "C" Co displaced forward to (13.9-10.8) preparing for same Bn advance.
 

(2) 2d Bn: Nil activity night 19-20. A "D" Co platoon reached vicinity (15.85-10.5) and killed one enemy armed with rifle. Twenty yards further the platoon came under MG and rifle fire. In an ensuing fire fight two enemy were known to have been killed; we suffered one wounded. The platoon estimates 20-30 enemy are dug in this vicinity. Artillery fire was placed on the area and at the close of period the platoon is again advancing on the position. No report of further action. One enemy carrying a surrender leaflet surrendered himself to "E" Co vicinity (14.05-10.55).
 

b. Artillery: The artillery fired four harassing missions night 19-20, four preparations in conjunction with 185th RCT's advance and one on an enemy concentration in RCT sector.

4. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: Groups of enemy continue to be contacted in the vicinity of Hill 3355; however, no permanent positions have been encountered. One group, est­imated at 20-30 encountered vicinity (15.85-10.5),was encountered. Action against the position still in progress at close of period. Four enemy apparently stragglers were encountered to the rear of the RCT area.

5. INTENDED OPERATIONS 21 May: A Divisional Artillery Concentration covering the ridges between Hills 3355 and 4055 will be placed during the morning 21 May. Both Bn's will advance under this barrage as far and as quickly as possible. See overlay for concentration area and routes of advance.

One enemy with surrender leaflet, unarmed, surrendered to E Co.

Dog Co killed one enemy, received MG fire, rifle and a believed American grenade, suffered one WIA, proceeded to (15.85-10.6) and killed 2 more enemy, requested art fire.

Memo from 503d Hqs, 20 May 45, prohibiting the use of land mines as booby traps. All companies & attached units advised.

As noted from the RCT S-1 Journal above this is the last day men will be sent to rest camp.

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1300

Entire RCT received unit citation pursuant to General Orders #112, USFFE, dated 8 May 45 for Corregidor operation.

1700

Orders issued suspending rest camp; too many violations."

Unit Co's certified to reading of venereal disease directives to all personnel.

[This last was proof positive that the rear base didn't know a war was going on up in the hills. Then too, after running a rest camp for a few days I'm sure they were tired of all this extra duty and suspended it. At least two companies got to rest 35 men.]

"3. OUR OPERATIONS:

a. Infantry:

(1) 1st Bn: Nil activity during night 20-21. The Bn began a general advance toward its objective - ridge (14.8-12.0). "A" Co returned from the right flank and will act as guard and guide along supply route. A "B" Co patrol advanced along base of Hill 4055 and at the close of period had reached vicinity (13.3-11.5). One enemy of a group of three was killed when encountered vicinity (13.3-11.4). The other two escaped to the east. "C" Co reinforced, moved N and E and at close of period had advanced to (14.5-11.1) with nil contact."

"f. One 50 Cal multiple MG and one 90mm rifle attached to RCT and went into position (12.3-10.7) and (12.3-10.6) respectively.
 

4. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: Elements of the 1st Bn advanced toward the RCT objective meeting little resistance. Aerial and artillery conducted day-long softening bombardment of the objective in preparation for a renewed advance by both Bns.

5. INTENDED OPERATIONS FOR MAY 22: Continued advance toward ridge (14.7-12.1)-(15.8-10.7) by both Bns. 1st Bn on the left, 2d on the right."

Received memo, 503d RCT, 21 May 45. Subject: Cessation of Rest Camp. Letter read in entirety to all personnel and report of compliance made to Regt'l S-1."

[Note: Again staff nonsense. Get out to all the patrols and outposts and read the letter in its entirety and report compliance. The men who will get no R&R sure do need to know that they will get no R&R because some of the men who did get the leave shacked up with women in Bacolod.]

Air strike by 4 P-38's, bombe & strafed target.

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 2. Weather and visibility: Heavy intermittent rain and overcast; visibility very limited.

3. OUR OPERATIONS:

a. Infantry:

(1) 1st Bn: Nil activity night 21-22. A "A" Co patrol moving NE was fired upon vicinity (14.35-11.2). After a short fire fight in which three enemy were killed the patrol attempted to move forward. MG and rifle fire prevented an advance, subsequently the patrol moved to the E. In vicinity (14.6-11.1) the patrol observed enemy to the right and left flank apparently attempting an ambush. Another short fire fight ended in killing two enemy as the patrol withdrew to call for artillery. The patrol estimated the enemy to be about 30 in number. "B" Co's overnight reconnaissance patrol reported reaching vicinity (14.7-11.7) without contact. The patrol stated a possible route to ridge (14.8-12.0) located. "C" Co dispatched reconnaissance patrols to the N, E, and NE searching for route of advance to ridge vicinity (15.5-11.3). Nil report end of period. 

(2) 2d Bn: Nil activity night 21-22. "D" Co advancing toward crest of Hill 3355 at (15.9-10.7) reached vicinity (15.85-10.55) and received rifle and MG fire from the crest and from the right flank. "D" Co withdrew after a short fire fight due to its exposed position. Artillery and 4.2 mortars was brought to bear on the position with unobserved results. We suffered 1 WIA. An "F" Co security patrol received rifle and MG fire vicinity (15.25-09.8). The patrol returned the fire but withdrew in favor of the artillery. A second "F" Co security patrol NE to vicinity (13.4-11.5) reported nil activity. 

b. Artillery: The artillery maintained a harrassing fire throughout night 21-22 on vicinity (16.4-10.6). Continued on call for ground advance, firing several support missions.

c. Engineers: Hand and mechanical building and maintenance of supply route.
 

4. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: Increasing enemy resistance is being met by the advance toward the RCT objective especially in the Hill 3355 approaches.

5. INTENDED OPERATIONS FOR 23 MAY: An advance to crest of Hill 3355 by "E" Co and to the ridge. (14.7-12.2)-(15.5-11.3) by "A" and "B" Cos after artillery and mortar preparations

P.R. No 38 leaves it unclear as to whether Hill 3355 was taken. It is clear now that it is still held by the enemy. We are learning to use our artillery and heavy mortar support better and better. This saved many lives. Most of the Jap positions were positioned so that they could not be flanked. This necessitated frontal attacks. The only sane method of attacking such defenses was with the maximum use of artillery and all supporting weapons which could be brought to bear.

The fresh bread is like the cream for the coffee mentioned in the 16 May entry.   It did not seem to get to the line companies. Cream! This brings to mind the battalion journal entry for 16 February where we got "flour" for breakfast.

At 0900 the CO, Lt. Collins, the 3rd plat under Lt. Watkins, and the 2nd plat under S/Sgt Minor moved E on "SECRET TRAIL" to assault the enemy position. As the 3rd plat led up the side of the ridge an enemy outpost opened fire and wounded Pvt. Rouse in the head. Under heavy small arms and HMG fire the 2nd and 3rd squads laid down a base of fire. The 1st squad under S/Sgt Dablock unsuccessfully attempted to flank the enemy on the left. While the 3rd plat continued to fire, the 2nd plat attempted to flank the position on the right but were prevented by the steep slope leading to the Jap position.

When flanking the enemy was found to be hopeless, the Co withdrew and returned to the perimeter at 1330. One enemy was killed during attempted night infiltration.

Co remainded (sic) in position. Men returned from rest camp. Appr 10 Nips infiltrated into our perimeter during night. One Nip placed a 15 lb charge into the tent of 2nd platt HQ. failed to explode. Also threw a small anti-personel (sic) (bomb) that did not explode. One Nip K.I.A. No casualtys. Nips were dressed full combat equipment, banzai sticks, hand grenades, ropes, engr shovels & picks.

No report.

After the enemy evacuated this area attacked by "D" Company, it was discovered that the position consisted of a total of 24 pillboxes in three supporting lines surrounded by slopes too steep to climb without great difficulty.

The difficulty encountered in the terrain upon which  we were operating,   now on the right flank, and the excellent use by the Japanese in developing their defensive positions is well explained in the following "Historical Report (Intelligence), Operation 1A Negros (Occidental):

"Also the sector, now was composed of mountains from 2000 to 6000 feet in height, which terrain became more suitable for the enemy when he chose to defend. The enemy location mainly always on the higher ground was more favorable for ambush; a manuever which the enemy used with success particularly at the top of steep climbs in well camouflaged positions and at very sharp turns in the trail. The usual outposts were encountered as each group, no matter how small, was moderately security conscious."

 "On mountain trails which were consistently on volcanic ridges, in many tcases long stretches of the trail were only a few feet wide with sides running 80 to 90 degrees, dropping down many hundreds of feet to a chasm or a river. At a point where a climb was too steep to reach the next higher and wider level, a Jap machine gun position or point of heavy fire would be encountered, pinning the troops on the trail and making necessary withdrawals hazardous."

As can be seen from the reports, we are now encountering organized resistance.

 "The movement to the rendezvous point ordered by Lt. General Kono April 29 to Hill 3355 was still in progress. In the confusion many (of the Japanese) had become lost in the extremely rugged country to be passed through on their way to the objective. Many small groups had taken the opportunity during the confusion to desert and roam the hills.

The enemy's potential strength, though not organized, decreased little. While the above conditions existed it did not alter the same vigorous resistance by small groups when contacted with our forces was unavoidable."

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"a.   Infantry:

(1)   1st Bn: At 221745 a returning group of six from "C" CO's position encountered nine enemy vicinity (13.0-10.7). Six enemy were killed and one of our troops was wounded during the resulting fire fight. A litter party was dispatched from "A" Co to bring the wounded and was ambushed by an unknown number of enemy using MG's and rifles. The litter party returned the fire in a twenty minute engagement and then withdrew because of darkness. We suffered one wounded in this encounter. "A" Co killed one enemy later in the night as he attempted to pass through the perimeter at (14.05-10.70). Nil other activity night 22-23. "C" Co began advancing toward the ridge (14.7-12.0)-(15.8-11.0) at 230730 reaching (15.75-10.8). Two enemy were killed in route and six more after the company had taken up its position straddling the ridge. "B" Co displaced forward to "C" Co's previous position (15.35-10.8) without contact. "A" Co platoon began advancing at 230830 with the mission of engaging the group ambushing the litter party 221800. A short fire fight resulted in which "A" Co suffered 1 KIA and 1 WIA. Enemy casualties were unknown. The platoon withdrew to place 4.2 mortar on the position. At close of period another force was investigating the results.

(2)   2d Bn: "At 230120 a small raiding party estimated at 6-10 attempted infiltration of "E" Co's position vicinity (15.55-10.50) with the results of one known enemy dead. Others thought to have been wounded due to abandonment of several "banzai" sticks. One 25 lb homemade bomb failed to explode when thrown into the foxhole of one of our troops. Nil other activity night 22-23. "D" Co, returning to become Bn reserve, went into position (13.85-10.85). At 231200 sniper fired on three Engineers attached to "D" Co when they were filling their canteens at a water hole outside the Co perimeter. All were killed and the attackers withdrew before a rescue party could reach the scene. "E" Co resumed its attack upon the enemy position vicinity (15.85-10.55) after artillery fire on the position. They again drew heavy MG and rifle fire but were known to inflict a known 2 enemy KIA before again withdrawing to await a mortar barrage on the position. "F" Co dispatched to attempt a flanking movement against "A" Co's opposition, encountering fire from at least 2 Mg's and additional heavy rifle fire vicinity (14.3-11.2). Fire and movement against this force cost "F" Co 4 wounded before Co withdrew in favor of a mortar concentration. 

b. Artillery: The artillery has kept continuous harassing fire on all suspected and likely enemy positions throughout the period, in addition to one direct support mission and working two air-strike targets. 

c. Engineers: Continued maintenance and building RCT supply routes. Three engineers attached to "D" Co were killed at a water point outside the Co perimeter by an unknown number of enemy. 

d. Air: Two morning air strikes at (15.7-11.3). 

4. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: 1st Bn succeeded in reaching RCT objective, ridge (14.7-12.0)-(15.8-11.0) and taking up positions astride a probable enemy route between Hills 4055 and 3355. 2d BN encountered an evidely (sic) well emplaced enemy position vicinity (15.85-10.55). The position denies access to Hill 355 from SW by our forces. Small enemy groups were encountered throughout the sector.

5. INTENDED OPERATIONS FOR 24 MAY: Continued development of ridge (14.7-12.0)-(15.8-11.0) by 1st Bn and assault of HILL 3355 by 2d Bn."

1st platt made an attack against a heavily defended ridge to our front. Area attacked had been heavily plastered with 75's and 4.2 & 60mm prior to attack. When platt moved forward they came under heavy sniper fire, and finally withdrew back to perimeter. No activity during night. Two NIP bodies found by 1st platt, prob K.I.A. by arty. 

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2. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY: Generally overcast with intermittent rain, visibility fair.

3. OUR OPERATIONS:

a. Infantry;

(1) 1st Bn: 1st Bn: 'C" Co kilted one enemy in vicinity of its position on the ridge (15.8-10.8). Two enemy were killed by "A" Co during the night 23-24. "B" Co reported nil activity, and "C" Co reported only movement in the under-brush outside its perimeter. "A" Co dosplaced (sic) to "B" Co's position as "B" Co joined "C" Cp on the objective ridge. No contact was made during these moves. A "C" Co patrol moving NW on the objective ridge observed one enemy that fled apparently injured.

(2) 2d Bn: An "F" Co patrol killed one rifle-armed enemy vicinity (14.3-11.2) at 231715 near the ambush which killed two Engineers. "E" Co reported receiving 4 rounds of rifle during the night. Nil other activity. A "D" Co patrol to (13.5-11.7) reported fresh footprints to ne but nil contact. A second "D" Co patrol with the mission of reconnoitering DANAO trail encountered a Regt'l patrol in a fire fight vicinity (14.1-10.1). one of the intelligence patrol had been killed. After exchanging a few shots "D" Co patrol evacuated the KIA and returned to establish an ambush in the vicinity. Nil results at close of period. "E" Co again encountered the strong enemy position vicinity (15.85-1-.55) and placed 60mm. mortar fire on the position with unknown results. An "F" Co patrol found one enemy dead in the vicinity of yesterday's firefight at 1(14.3-11.2). A supply train guard killed one enemy vicinity (14.2-10.3).

b.   Artillery: the artillery maintained harrassing fire during the hours of darkness 23-24. Three time on target missions were also fired. An FA Officer verified 2 enemy suicides in vicinity of MURCIA (TOWN). Both were wearing cut off American khaki trousers."

c.   Engineers: Continued maintance (sic) and building of RCT supply route.

RESULTS OF OPERATIONS:    Our position on the suspected escape route between HILLS 4055 and 3355 were strengthened, closing that to the enemy. Patrols in the sector continued to encounter enemy in varied locations within the area.

 INTENDED OPERATIONS FOR 25 MAY: 1st Bn to further strengthen its position along ridge (14.7-12.0)-(15.8-11.0) and to patrol that adjacent area. 2d Bn to extensively patrol the area to the SW of the ridge and eliminate small enemy group known to be in that locality."

"0730 E Co report's receiving 4 rds rifle during the nite, no other activity reported.

Casualties yesterday, hq Co -  1 WIA,  F Co - 4 WIA

Lt Watkins D co with patrol assisted RHQ patrol in fire fight with enemy,' evacuated 1 KIA (RNQ) to D Co perimeter.

E Co reports phone wire cut between D & E Cos by enemy. Fox Co reports one enemy KIA found buried.

Short patrols, no activity, Nil act during night. Password, Mail Call.

During one period, I do not remember exactly when, "F" Company was moving up through one of the other companies,  probably "D" Company, and we stopped to rest within their perimeter. There was a trail junction within the perimeter. The ridge was fairly open. Just about the time we settled on the ground, all hell broke loose. The ridge was swept with several minutes of heavy machine gun and mortar fire. The attack stopped as suddenly as it started. The Japs had disappeared. I don't believe either of our companies suffered any casualties.

As I ended the comments on "F" Company for the 23rd, the company was in position on the river. I may be off on the time here. Memory can be fickle. This could have been several days earlier, but it is worth repeating.

We had been ordered to patrol up a broad trail towards a mining settlement located on the river. The Japs were supposed to be in the town (Danao - I don't know). We followed the trail to the bend in the river where the map showed the town to be. There was not a building or sign of a town there until we searched the heavy underbrush and found a number of concrete pillars which had once been the foundations of buildings. These moss covered blocks in the dense jungles were in the right place, but there was no town here and no sign of Japs. To make certain we followed the trail for about a mile further, where we approached rocky eminences rising up a hill. The trail led up between two boulders, huge pillars. As we quietly approached the changing terrain and could see the rocks plainly, we heard voices. They certainly were not American. Using the age old maximum that discretion is the better part of valor, we retraced our steps very quietly. I notified battalion of our findings.

Early the next morning Colonel Jones came up to our position, and he was not happy. He told me he had it on good authority that the mining town was still there, and still inhabited. He told me to give him a rifle squad, and he was going up and would find it himself. I offered to go, but he told me to stay with the company and take care of business. I gave him a platoon - by that point,  all of 13 or 14 men. When the colonel saw the three BAR's,  he questioned me as to what kind of squad was that.  I think the colonel was shocked to see our actual  under-strength. It's one thing to see it on paper and quite another to meet it in person.

Several hours later they returned, and the colonel went on back down the trail alone. The "squad" told me they took Col. Jones to the site where the town had once stood and showed him the concrete foundations. After this they followed the trail until they could see the rocks and were showing the colonel the trail going up between the two great boulders when a Jap machine gun opened up on them. They withdrew without harm and returned to the company CP.       

Given his solo journeys, it is a wonder Colonel Jones survived the war. He would traverse dangerous country alone, without a second thought.  This was almost a daily routine.  I suspect he had been given bad information by the Filipino Army units (guerillas),  itself their daily routine, and he had wanted to see for himself. I expect that somewhere back on the plains, safe from any sudden sound and shock, a group of  guerillas were eating hot rations and bitching about  the lack of supplies being given to them.  Colonel Jones left without expressing an opinion, and I was not about to tell the RCT commander that "I told you so."

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