The forward turret top was opened by a
240-mm hit. The opening occurred at the seam and was about 3-1/2 feet
long by 6 inches wide. No damage occurred inside the turret, and it was
not manned at the time. The bad feature was that when both turrets were
firing at the same time, the flash from the rear turret entered the
forward turret. This was remedied by welding a one-inch piece of iron
over the opening, and fortunately, there was no other hit in this place.
The 6-inch casemate guns on the south
side were repeatedly put out of action temporarily by enemy artillery
fire. In the interior of the casemate, fragments tore off the range
drums and sight brackets and from time to time damaging the elevating
and traversing mechanism of the guns. This was repaired, but
considerable time was required to put the guns back into action. The
upper gun was hit twice on the outside of the tube by direct hits by
240-mm howitzer. The extent of the dent on the inside was measured by
use a star gauge. The hit near the muzzle was found to be 86/1000 and
the hit near the center of the tube was 173/1000. When this was
reported to the Harbor Defense Ordinance Officer, he stated that the gun
could no longer be used, as the dent was too large in area and protruded
too far on the inside of the tube. This was the only seacoast gun on
the Fort which was permanently put out of action by enemy fire.
The 3-inch battery sustained damage
about 25 minutes prior to the surrender by a hit from a Japanese dive
bomber, but this could have been repaired.
The two 3-inch antiaircraft guns on
the top deck were completely put out of action by enemy artillery fire.
The two air-cooled 50-caliber machine guns were also completely
destroyed by enemy artillery fire. The four water-cooled 50-caliber
antiaircraft machine guns were damaged from time to time, but prompt
repairs were always made and the guns were ready to meet the next
attack.
All the installations in the cage mast
were destroyed by enemy fire, but this did not hamper our operations in
any manner. The concrete hull of the structure stood up very well under
the prolonged pounding and only about 6 or 8 feet at the most were
whittled away by enemy action. However, it was noticed that the longer
these bombardments lasted, the more damage was resulting to the Fort by
hits of the same caliber which had previously not inflicted so much
damage. This was probably due to the concrete being shattered and to
the loss of bond between the concrete and the large steel reinforcing
rods. The large reinforcing rods were two feet below the top of the
outside surface and there were no smaller reinforcing rods or mesh near
the surface. The 240-mm projectile would bury itself under the
reinforcing and then detonate.
5. Conclusions.
The enemy was denied the use of Manila
Bay for five months. That the enemy both wanted and needed this bay is
an unchallenged fact. The bay was guarded by two things, seacoast
artillery and mines. The mine field guarding the south channel was a
Navy contact field planted prior to the war. These mines had been
detonating accidentally in great quantities ever since the field was
laid and its effectiveness as a barrier had been dissipated. That this
mine defense had failed was known to the enemy, was evidenced by the
fact that at the surrender, 12 enemy ships sailed into the south channel
abreast, through the mine fields and back again without sweeping. The
remaining defense was seacoast artillery, and it is a matter of record
that almost all of the open seacoast batteries had either been knocked
out or rendered ineffective with the outstanding exception of the
14-inch guns on Fort Drum guarding the south channel. It is this
officer's opinion that properly designed, completely closed turrets,
mounted on a strong concrete steel emplacement, correctly sited to
command 360° fields of fire will prove unquestionably superior to any
other seacoast fortification known to us at the present time.
