. When they did attack it was too late, and their assaults were evidently conceived as suicidal banzais rather than tactical countermoves. Another Jap error was the very natural one of complete confusion. Observing the approach of the amphibious forces, they should have clung to their tunneled gun positions, even after the paratroops landed, for they were safe and could still repel the beach landing. Instead they swarmed out in the open and were either killed or disorganized, thus forfeiting their best hope of inflicting heavy casualties. Yet for all their mistakes, the Japs were not wholly accountable. In each instance they acted as the circumstances they found seemed to dictate--and that is the way all men act in combat. From this hasty sketch it can be seen that Chance commanded them as it commanded us, but with this difference: our leaders had thrown all their forces into the conflict with such recklessness that the aggressive elements of initiative and surprise formed our strongest reinforcements; whereas the Japs, taken unaware at the start, were overcome as much by confusion and suicidal despair as by our assaults. It is these decisive, imponderable factors which make it impossible for the tactician to award an umpire's decision in favor of the army with the best basic principles. Too often the unexpected happens, and the wrong way wins.