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FORTIFICATIONS
ON BATAAN;
roadblock near the Mauban line. |
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The War Plans Division study is of considerable
interest, not only for the effect it may have had on MacArthur's
requests for a joint advance through the Netherlands Indies to Mindanao,
but also for its realistic appraisal of the strategic situation in the
Far East and the importance of the Philippine Islands. Accepting General
MacArthur's estimate of Japanese strength in the Philippines and of the
length of time he could hold out against serious attack-three month-the
Army planners- agreed that the loss of the Philippines, "the key to the
Far East position of the Associated Powers," would be a decisive blow,
followed probably by the fall of the Netherlands Indies and Singapore.37
Australian and British trade routes would then be seriously threatened,
while Japan's strength would be increased by control of the raw
materials in the Indies. The isolation of China was "almost certain to
follow." This analysis coincided with MacArthur's, as did the plan of
operations outlined to recover the Philippines.
It was when the planners considered the means necessary to carry out
these operations that they found themselves in disagreement with
General MacArthur. They estimated that 1,464 aircraft of various
types, only about half of which were available, would be necessary
to advance from Australia to Luzon. The difference would have to
come from other areas-Hawaii, Panama, and the United States-and from
lend-lease aircraft already committed. Additional airfields would
have to be built in Australia and along the line of advance. The
line of communications to Australia would have to be made secure and
a logistical organization developed to support the drive northward.
Such an effort, the planners estimated, would require very large
naval resources. With the vessels already in the area, the Allies
would have to transfer 7 to 9 capital ships, 5 to 7 carriers, about
50 destroyers, 60 submarines, and the necessary auxiliary vessels
from the Atlantic and Mediterranean to the Pacific and Far East. The
diversion of naval forces might well result in the loss of the
supply routes to Europe and the Middle East and would severely limit
the defense of the Western Hemisphere. It was not surprising,
therefore, that the War Plans Division concluded that the relief of
the Philippine garrison could not be accomplished in the three
months left, and that the allocation of such sizable forces to the
project would represent a major and unjustifiable diversion from the
main effort.
There is no record of any formal approval of the
conclusions of the War Plans Division. Both Secretary Stimson and
General Marshall noted the study but made no comment. If there had ever
been any serious consideration given to MacArthur's proposals to send an
expedition to the relief of the beleaguered Philippine garrison, the War
Plans study put an end to such hopes. But there was no relaxation of the
determination to send General MacArthur whatever aid was within the
means of the United States and its Allies. President Roosevelt had time
and again stated his desire to do so and as late as 30 December had
written Stimson that he wished the War Plans Division to explore every
possible means of relieving the Philippines. "I realize great risks are
involved," he said, "but the objective is important."
While the President's stated desire remained the
official policy of the government and the hope of the American people,
the strategy evolved by the Allies placed more realistic limits to the
objectives they hoped to attain.
