THE ROCK FORCE ON CORREGIDOR
 

 

22 February 1945

 

 

 

No. 7
211800I February 45
to
221800I  February 45

"3. OUR OPERATIONS:

 

a. Infantry: Our continued mopping up process concentrated on the BATTERY POINT, ROCK POINT, WHEELER POINT, SEARCHLIGHT POINT, GEARY POINT and MALINTA HILL areas; SEARCHLIGHT and WHEELER POINTS containing the larg­est concentration of enemy. During night of 21-22 Feb., MALINTA HILL was rocked by a terrific explosion that caused flame to issue from all tunnel entrances. It is doubtful that any enemy survived the blast. Our mopping up procedure utilized naval bombardment extensively."

 

"4. CASUALTIES:

a. Our Casualties: This report - 12 KIA, 35    WIA, 11 IIA, 13 MIA.

    To Date- 101 KIA, 283 WIA, 11 IIA, 197    Jump IIA, 13 MIA.

b. Enemy Known Casualties:    This Report-    119 KIA, 1 PW

         To date - 2509 KIA, 4 PWs."

 


#109 0800

Air strikes and strafing north of Malinta Hill.

0930

 Cub plane landed on parade ground. Used for observation and liaison to X1 Corps.

1000

Navy strike on cliffs between Geary Point and Searchlight Point.

1100

Navy moved to area between Searchlight Point and Wheeler Pt.

1800

 All Bns continued patrolling and sealing caves. "D" Co met resistance near Wheeler Point* and lost 4 men KIA. Area very quiet. All wounded and injured evacuated and area being cleaned up. Plans made for continued air strikes on Malinta Hill & East part of Island. 1st Bn getting ready to move in the morning to San Jose beach to be ready for assault on East part of Island.

D Co attacked and lost 4 men on 24 February. There was no attack on Wheeler Point on 22 February. The entry has been placed in the wrong date.

2400

Nite quiet and less flares used. practically no art fire."

 

 "The plan went thru yesterday the cos. circling from north, south and center to the western point of the island. Some resistance was met; not very much. There were about twenty more caves and tunnels closed up. Its a rough go - you have to get into everyone and then close it up with demolitions or the Nips go back in. We've found that if you close up a tunnel without completely blocking it, when you come back its reoccupied. There can't be very much left on this end."

Yet thirteen (13) 2nd Battalion men were to die on this western end from the 22nd on. On Topside the illusion was, and apparently continued to be, that the western end was practically clear of Japs.

 

   "We've found evidence where the Japs have stripped and swam for Bataan. The PT boats have picked off quiet a few. Our battalion is pulling the same mission today - sweeping the western end of the island. The same interdictory firing was kept up last night by mortars and howitzers and we had the same perimeter with the same results. Most of the activity now is at Malinta Tunnel. I don't think that anyway has yet been devised of the final disposition of that immense hole. Its being bombed by P-47's, howitzers - there's machine guns set up at the entrances - they've even yelled in for them to surrender. Something'll happen there today. We have a bulldozer up here now that's cleared a cub strip on the parade ground- there's a rumor that some general is coming in on it, in a cub, no less. Almost all the chutes are gathered up from the fields.

 The companies are pushing thru according to yesterday's schedule. "E" Co. has closed up some more tunnels with not much opposition. The report from "F" Co. came in a little while ago; they ran into some stiff machine gun opposition and had three killed and two wounded. One of those killed was Lt. MacKenzie of this company (4 were killed). One other was hit with buckshot all over his face and chest. This may be an isolated  group but, then, they may be pouring out of caves because they're afraid of being sealed up alive. A cub landed on the parade ground this morning. Just heard that another officer from "E" Co. was wounded - this battalion is mightly short of officers now."

"Co. patrolled thru ravine below big gun position and down to the beach. They worked along the shore toward Wheeler Point. They blew up several caves and tunnels and killed two unarmed Japs. Co. suffered no casualties."

The S-3 account above stating that D company had four men KIA obviously is in error. They must be referring to D company's action two days hence, i.e., 24 February.

I want to add a comment made by Doc Bradford in his account of 21 February. He states that after the action was over a barge had been summoned by radio to take out the man killed and the two wounded. D Company History said the dead man was Pvt. Brady (William G.). Lt Buchanan, company commander, and Bowers, an attached medic, were wounded. In speaking of the boy's death, Doc recalled...

 "(he) had bunked with us on the perimeter the last night, joking about silk and nylon as he bedded down on his parachute on the concrete floor. A boy of smiling courage, of laughing endurance, of jovial manliness. Not much was said in the way of regrets. There never is- we all know the costs, and we can feel the cheapness of talk. But our hearts were heavy when the the landing barge plowed into the cove and dropped its ramp grudgingly down on the rocks ten yards from shore. We waded, and stumbled, and almost swam out to it with the body, and then with our two wounded men. Lt. Buchanan, still anxious about his men, warned, "Watch out on the way back -- some of those suckers could still be laying for you up there!" Another Lieutenant replied, 'O.K., and you watch out for those nurses back in the Hospital!' With a wide grin spreading across his face as he waved us goodbye, the barge backed off gratingly as it had come."

Only Doc, with his great compassion and understanding could properly describe this scene.

 

"Light patrol work between Morrison Point and Rock Point. Area is fairly clear, 6 Nips KIA.  Lt Whitson and Pfc. Dvorsack LIA by grenade concussion. The first platoon, which was very short of men has been split up between the second and third platoons."

 
"First platoon moved down Sheeney Ravine in the attack & met heavy enemy resistance consisting of rifle and machine gun fire. During this action Pfc. Narrow, Yocum & Sgt George Mikel was killed. Pfc. Stanley Maciborski was lightly wounded in action. Company strength is 3 officers and 100 EM."
 

The named casualties do not mention 2d Lt. Clifford MacKenzie, KIA, who was from 2d Bn HHq Co. Maciborski was SWA, not LWA - half of his face had been blasted by a shotgun.

I seriously doubt the "F" Co reported strength. As stated before, only two officers were present for duty. The 1st platoon was down to 17 EM's, and all the platoons had suffered casualties. I don't believe the 2nd platoon had hardly any more for duty than did the 1st platoon. The 3rd platoon had numerous casualties, as did the 4th platoon. The count was more likely 85 EM's, possibly less considering jump injuries. When we returned to Mindoro, and we suffered no battle casualties after the 22nd, the company was at half strength; however there was illness.

 

 

 

 

 

When it was no longer necessary to have the Pack Howitzers along on patrol for cave closings, they were set up on Topside.
Topside itself was cleared sufficiently to become a landing strip for artillery spotting observation aircraft.

 

 

 

 

 

OPEN THIS ARTICLE IN A FRESH PAGE

OPEN IN SAME FRAME

 

The entire company moved down to the rim between Batteries Smith and Grubbs early this morning. We knew there were Japs in Grubbs Ravine, and today we were to clean them out.

Remember, what we now know today as Grubbs Ravine was called Sheeney Ravine in the F Company history. We knew that Grubbs Trail running along the north slope of Sunset Ridge intersected the asphalt-surfaced North Shore Road near the sea. We had traveled this route the day before in returning from the Cape Corregidor area to Battery Smith. We had seen that North Shore Road turned sharply from the sea eastward up the depths of the ravine. On the map we could see that after about two hundred yards it reversed itself and ran back, westward, toward the sea. In other words North Shore road made a "V" here with the apex in the very bottom of the ravine. On the north slope of Grubbs Ravine, Way Hill ridge, was another trail running along the slope, Rock Point Trail. Since the ridges dominated the ravine it was obvious that they must be occupied by friendly force before a force could sweep the ravine. The 2nd platoon was ordered to move down Grubbs Trail and occupy it all the way to the junction of Grubbs Trail with North Shore Road. The 3rd platoon was ordered to move down Rock Point Trail and occupy it to the point where it turn( sharply back to the northeast. In these positions the platoons would be on each side of the ravine looking down on the "V" and the stretches of North Shore Road running back to the sea. As I've said previously, even though the area was covered by large trees, the bombings and shellings had cleared out so much foliage so that visibility was good. As E Co. passed up the road the 21st, they surely saw the "V" below passing over a road culvert. Visible also nearby sitting on the bank of the dry stream bed was a small, metal covered building (corrugated steel roofing) about 12 feet x 12 feet in area.

 The first platoon was given the mission on sweeping the ravine as a line of skirmishers. The 4th platoon would follow about fifty yards to our rear. Immediately behind them was the attached light machine gun platoon, 2nd Lt MacKenzie's 3rd platoon.

In addition to our platoon medic, Pfc. Jensrud, the company medic was also attached. This was T-5 William E. Ashton. At least one flame-thrower team and a demolition team were also attached. We waited on the rim prepared to move out down the steep incline.

After a time both the 2nd and the 3rd platoons radioed in that they were in position. Lt. Bailey and I both were surprised that they had reached their objectives so quickly and with no opposition. He questioned both platoon sergeants and was assured that they were in position. So we crossed our line of departure.

The upper part of the ravine was completely cleared of trees and vegetation. After about a hundred yards we entered the tree cover. As I've said, the trees were large, but the foliage was cleared out enough for visibility to be good. I was exactly in the middle of the ravine walking down a dry stream bed, and I could see my entire skirmish line going up both slopes. They could see me and thus the line stayed relatively even. We moved slowly. The ground was rough and sloped steeply. In addition the bombs and shells had cut thousands of branches off so that there was a cover of debris to negotiate. I was walking in the rocky stream bed with banks about two to three feet high as we neared the "V". We knew the enemy was there waiting to get us in the most advantageous position for him to open fire. We just hoped that our troops on the flanks would spot the enemy as soon as he showed himself. It was hot, but I think we were perspiring more than usual because of the tension. There is much unnerving about walking straight forward making a target of yourself to induce the enemy to open fire.

We came to the area where we could see the metal-covered building on the left bank. As I drew even with the building I could see the road culvert about twenty feet past the building. Pfc. Stanley Maciborski was walking along the bank on my immediate left. He passed the building without looking in the door which was on the west side. I hopped out of the stream bed to take a look. Pvt. George Mikel, my extra runner, was walking on the right, north, bank on my immediate right. He saw what I was doing and hopped down into the streambed to follow me.

At this moment a shotgun blast broke the silence and, on that signal, all hell broke loose.   

Rifle and machine gun fire seemed to be coming from everywhere. The enemy had waited until we got to his planned spot and opened up front and both flanks. Our men had to take what cover they could and lie very quietly. I notified Lt. Bailey of the situation. He said to hold on until the two flanking platoons got into their positions. The following radio transmissions turned the air blue. Machine gun fire was coming from above us on Rock Point Trail along with rifle fire. Rifle fire was coming from the culvert (RC-6). The heaviest machine gun and rifle fire was coming from the area between Grubbs Trail and North Shore Road toward the junction. There were two cave entrances there. This was an open area and the Japs were out of the caves (actually it was one huge cave) and pouring it on us. The Jap defenses actually had been set up to repel an attack from the sea. For example, the culvert's side toward us (east) was open. The west side was covered with stones and concrete slabs built up as a wall with slits left to fire through. Then there was a machine gun, one at least, up on our left flank around the trail firing down our line. I knew Maciborski had been hit and was lying there. Lying beside the building I looked down into the streambed and saw George Mikel lying on his back on the large stones. I could not tell if he was alive. On the other side of the streambed crouching behind a tree trunk about ten inches thick was Sgt Todd. I told him to get flat, that the tree wasn't big enough to cover him. I could see the 4th platoon coming straight down the streambed. I told Todd to hold everyone in place, that I was going to try and get to the mortar platoon and get them into action. Not knowing if Mikel was alive I told him not to move. I was going to get the mortars in place, and we'd have him out in a little while. I ran to the mortar platoon, scared the same way Russian Porzucek said he was the third night. The mortar platoon set-up and zeroed in on the open area between the road and the trail. This fire drove the Japs back into the two entrances. About this time the 2nd platoon arrived and knocked out the Jap machine gun up near the trail. The 3rd platoon, also, had arrived and cleared the right flank. The 2nd platoon moved on down to the junction and held the entire trail. They were above the cave entrances.  

I got back to the platoon just as Pfc. James Wilson threw a WP grenade into the culvert. When it exploded he jumped down into the stream bed and sprayed the area inside the culvert with his Thompson Sub Machine Gun. He killed eight Japs under there. Immediately afterwards, Pfc. Theodore Yocum ran across the road near the culvert and just as he reached the other side was hit in the head. He quivered and then was limp. Death was almost instantaneous. Mikel was dead. After I left he sat up, despite Todd's protest. At least one rifle bullet fired from a rifleman in the culvert had ripped through his chest. His first wound had been a bullet in the upper part of his thigh. The Japs evidently thought he was dead and had not fired again until he sat up. Pfc Paul Narrow was on the right slope. When the Japs opened up he was hit and died quickly. William Ashton saw him fall and ran through a hail of bullets to render medical aid. Ashton was shot but survived. Lt. MacKenzie, going to Ashton's aid, was killed.

 On the left front the Japs were still in the cave and firing out through the openings. Suddenly a great shower of potato masher hand grenades came flying out of the openings toward us. They landed well short and did no damage -- just caused a lot of noise. The 2nd platoon, or the demo team which had moved up with them, was trying to swing satchel charges into the cave openings from above, and the flame thrower, or throwers, were working along the slope to get within range of the entrances. I went up the right slope to check on our 1st squad.


James Bradley

 

 Pfc James Bradley, 2nd squad, was on the left slope. He says: "I do not remember if there was anymore than our platoon when we started out or not, but we were about half way down the canyon when the Japs started picking off some of our group on the right flank. It must have been Grubbs Ravine when we had the 2nd platoon with us. Our squad was on the direct end of the left flank and we were able to move without drawing fire. I remember that Mike Natalie and I found the mouth of the cave the Japs were in. We dropped several grenades into the opening and were able to drop to the roadway and dropped more grenades into a culvert where the Japs had holed up. It was here that Theodore Yocum caught one that was intended for me. I do not know to this day who yelled "look out Bradley!"' it may have been Yocum who called out. Anyway I ducked just in time, but I am sure that it was the same time that Yocum died. We tried satchel charges of TNT etc. And still the Japs would not come out. Then we emptied all the fuel we had in about four or five flame throwers, then we ignited it with the last flame thrower. It must have been pretty awful in there because they finally came running out of the cave. Half the poor buggers were on fire as they came running out. I remember Lampman standing behind a tree picking them off with his B.A.R. I remember I was out of ammo and unable to be of any assistance. At that time I guess it was really the only time I felt any anger for the Japs."


Richard Lampman

"We ran into a large cave complex before we realized it was there. We called for a demolition team and when they arrived they had used such a large charge we almost lost one of the demo team. The bank gave way; only quick action by the other members of the team saved him from going down the mountain."

 

 

I missed the flame thrower action, because I was up the north slope at this time. The Japs had been pinned on the south slope. The two squads on the north slope were still receiving heavy machine gun and rifle fire. I did not, nor did anyone else see all the action. As the ancient Greek said a man only sees in combat only that which happens nearby and that only imperfectly.

 

 


Bill Bailey

"It was down this ravine where the Japs were holed up in a culvert under a Bottomside Road and proved so difficult to wrinkle out. Sgt. Mikel was killed here and I believe 3 more K.I.A.'s before our flame throwers convinced the Nips to come out, one after the other running full bore only to be met by converging fire from everyone. I have no memory of a fourth man being killed here and have only recently become convinced that another was killed."

 

 

The machine gunners from 2d Battalion Headquarters Company were following my platoon. I do not remember if it was one section or the entire platoon. They must have been to the right of the mortar men. This would put them on the north slope behind our 1st and 3d squads. The platoon leader of the 3d light machine gun platoon was 2d Lieutenant Clifford MacKenzie.

 

 

"The report from "F" Co. came in a little while ago; they ran into stiff machine gun opposition and has three killed and two wounded. One of those killed was Lt. MacKenzie of this company. One other was hit with buckshot all over his face and chest."

 

Of course I knew three men from "F" company were killed- and, since I did not remember that MacKenzie was killed, I felt that this entry was mistaken. I also felt Bill Bailey must be mistaken in his belief that four were killed.

Then during the month of May, 1991 I came into possession of part of XI Corps General Order Number 11, 10 March 1945. Under "SECTION I................. SILVER STAR MEDAL - Posthumous awards" was the following citation:

SECOND LIEUTENANT CLIFFORD MACKENZIE

01305117, Infantry, United States Army. For gallantry in action at Corregidor, Philippine Islands on 22 February 1945. During an attack by our troops, a platoon was pinned down under a hail of light machine gun fire. One of the men in the platoon sustained mortal wounds and another soldier going to his aid was seriously wounded. Fully aware of the risks involved and totally disregarding the possible consequences, Lieutenant MacKenzie unhesitatingly plunged through the withering fire toward the wounded man and in so doing lost his life.  Lieutenant MacKenzie's display of valor, beyond the call of duty exemplifies the highest traditions of the military service. Next of kin: Mr. William S. MacKenzie, (father), 1410 Cortelyon Road, Brooklyn, New York."

 

   
 

I am now convinced that I am the one who has been mistaken and that Clifford MacKenzie did, indeed, die that morning in Grubbs Ravine. I had read Bennett Guthrie's account of MacKenzie's death in his book: "Three Winds of Death." This had not meant much to me because, in paraphrasing the citation, Guthrie had stated that the action took place during a Headquarters Company patrol. There are instances where a mistake was made in the date of an action, but I believe now that the evidence rules this out. First  of all, MacKenzie's platoon was the machine gun platoon ordinarily attached to F Company. Second, in following the squads on the north slope (this slope was about twice as long as was the south slope) MacKenzie would have been in perfect position to see what happened in front of him. Third, The 1st and 3d squads, on the north slope, came under the heaviest machine gun fire from the vicinity of Rock Point Trail. Fourth, Pfc Paul Narrow, 1st squad, was hit and killed. T-5 William E. Ashton, the company medic rushed to his aid and was hit by machine gun bullets in both ankles. The logical assumption was that MacKenzie was killed going to the aid of Ashton. Fifth, there was no other action which I know of which could fit this citation.

 In my memory I thought I talked to MacKenzie as we left the area going back up Grubbs Ravine. This is not true, and my memory of MacKenzie is not right. Since I had worked with MacKenzie and his platoon since we had jumped on Corregidor I came to know and trust him. I really think he was on Battery Hearn Magazine the third night with his machine gun section, but there was too much confusion that night for me to be sure.

 Doc Bradford also accompanied "F" Company down into the ravine. Doc really got around. A few years ago he wrote me a pretty good account of this fight from his memory after all these years. He said in effect that as he remembered ' .. I was conduct­ing the operation down in the draw."

 

RETURN TO DAY REPORT SUMMARY

 The cave openings were dirt openings. No concrete had been used at all. As I've said previously, we thought they were two caves while they really were openings into two tunnels which led back into a huge cave. There was a third opening. About fifty yards to the east just above Grubbs Trail was an almost vertical shaft opening into the cave which apparently was a ventilator shaft. Evidently the Japs had not backed far back into the cave when the flame throwers kept spraying their fluid into the entrances. They must have been staying close enough to the openings to get a shot at any of us who exposed ourselves. Then when the flame thrower operator flicked the igniter the fluid cov­ering everything instantly became a raging inferno catching the Japs by surprise, and they became human torches.

 The demolition section carried satchel charges and there were too few explosives for the large job of closing these entrances. Regimental Headquarters suffered five men KIA on Corregidor, and I believe all were in demolition sections. The effects of their work may have been less than desired, but the efforts of these men certainly were beyond question. The effects of their works was limited only because of their human load limits.

 Lt Bailey told me to take my platoon on back to our bivouac area at the lighthouse and let them rest. As a consequence I did not see the final efforts at sealing the entrances.

 We moved back to the lighthouse with sadden hearts. Three more of our own gone. Theodore Yocum's two young sons were now fatherless. Paul Narrow could have been a civilian back home enjoying life in the roll of a hero who had already done his duty. He had jumped in North Africa as a member of the 509th Parachute Battalion. His arm had been badly shot-up, and he had been returned to the States. He had to go to great lengths to convince Army doctors not to discharge him. He was happy and, he said, lucky to be in the 503d.

As noted in the the company history and Bill Bailey's statement, George Mikel was still called Sergeant Mikel. As a member of the 501st Parachute Battalion he could have been rotated home, but he flatly refused saying the 503d was his "my only home," and predicting that he would die in the company. He confided this to me on several occasions.

When a company suffered casualties usually a detail was assembled on Topside and sent down to carry out the dead and wounded. I have learned in the past few years that S/Sgt Bryan Ownby, 81mm mortar platoon, 2d Battalion Headquarters Company, was in charge of the detail sent down by battalion to collect our casualties. These litter parties were standard operating procedure (SOP). 

Bryan Ownby and George Mikel were old non-commissioned officers in the battalion and were well acquainted, so Bryan's memory of his detail picking up Mikel's body that morning is still vivid. No-one forgets the shock of suddenly seeing an old friend, a brother, lying there dead.

 These carrying parties turned the bodies of the dead over to Graves Registration for removal to the designated site and burial. It is a sad commentary to make about American soldiers, but some of the Graves Registration men looted bodies. Regulations required the deceased's effects to be placed in a rubber bag, sealed, and returned to the deceased's company in order for the appointed summary courts officer to send these personal effects to the next of kin. Many times, as in Mikel's case, no personal effects ever came.

 George Mikel had a wife in Australia, but he had failed to get official permission as required by regulations, so the marriage was not valid to our officials. George knew this and had no illusions about his wife collecting his insurance. Consequently, he collected all the Jap artifacts he could and sold them to air force, navy, and service personnel. This money was sent back to his wife in Australia. Both Phillip Todd and I knew that George had 800 pesos ($400.00) in his wallet which he kept in the buttoned-down left breast pocket of his fatigues, an expensive camera, and a good watch with himself that morning. No personal effects for George Mikel ever came through. I am dead sure of this, because I was summary courts officer for the company back on Mindoro. A good soldier died that morning as he had predicted that he would. I am glad to know that he was in good hands for a short time until they reached Topside, and I appreciate Bryan telling me this.

 Sgt. Ownby and his detail followed our force as we swept down Grubbs Ravine that morning. After the action started, Bryan risked his life in going forward to rescue some of our casualties. For his bravery he was awarded the Bronze Star Medal for Heroic Achievement.