ORIENTATION
INTRODUCTION.
This monograph
is an account of the operations of 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry
Regiment, in the landing on CORREGIDOR, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 16-February to 2
March 1945.
In order for
the reader to be given an appreciation of the situation prior to the airborne
assault against CORREGIDOR, it will be necessary to discuss briefly the major
events which led up to this operation.
Organized
resistance on the islands of LEYTE and MINDORO had ceased by the end of December
1944. On 9 January 1945, forces of United States Sixth Army landed at LINGAYAN
GULF, LUZON ISLAND, quickly secured a beachhead and pushed inland. By 3 February
1945, spearheads of these forces had reached the northern and eastern outskirts
of MANILA. (See Map A) (1)
United States
Eighth Army units in this sector were the 11th Airborne Division and XI Corps.
The former, making an amphibious on BATANGAS and advancing upon MANILA from the
south; the latter, after landing north of SUBIC BAY, had pushed south and was
now driving east across BATAAN PENINSULA with the mission of cutting the troops,
located here, off from the rest of LUZON. (See Map A) (2)
As soon as the
city of MANILA was liberated, it was imperative to secure promptly the entrance
to MANILA BAY, which was guarded by CORREGIDOR ISLAND, if the port of Manila was
to be utilized.
XI Corps,
Eighth Army, was assigned the mission of capturing this island objective;
however, this mission fell to Sixth Army, after zones of action for both Armies
were allocated, prior to the operation. The overall plan contemplated an
overland attack south to clear the east coast of BATAAN; an amphibious assault
on MARIVELES and a combined airborne-amphibious assault on the island of
CORREGIDOR. (See Map B) (3)
THE GENERAL SITUATION
With the
landing of I and XXV Corps, the enemy combat units were all caught in movement,
with the exception of the 23d Infantry Division to the southeast of the
beachhead, in the Central plain of LUZON, and the 58th Independent mixed brigade
-- twenty five miles north of LINGAYEN GULF. The Japanese 10th and 105th
Infantry Divisions were in the MANILA area. (See Map A) (4)
Elements of
the U.S. Eighth Army approaching MANILA from the south and U.S. Sixth Army units
from the north and northwest, had given early indication toward liberation of
the city. In gaining control of and clearing LUZON -- the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
would provide bases for future operations against the Japanese homeland. (5)
On 29 January,
troops of General Hall's XI Corps, under strategic direction of Eighth Army,
landed on the west coast of LUZON, near SUBIC BAY, meeting little opposition.
They drove east across the neck of BATAAN PENINSULA, as it was believed the
Japanese troops, in this area, would endeavor to follow the identical course
adopted by the hard pressed troops under General Wainwright in 1942. This course
had been a general withdrawal of troops from BATAAN and MANILA to the fortress
of CORREGIDOR, with a consequent increase in the defensive strength available to
the commander on CORREGIDOR. (See Map A) (6) (7)
Preceded by heavy air and naval
bombardment, elements of the 38th Division, XI Corps, landed on 15 February at
MARIVELES on the tip of BATAAN. (See Map B) Resistance was slight as our
soldiers advanced rapidly along the perimeter road west of MANILA BAY.. While
battle for the city still raged, General MacArthur moved to open MANILA BAY and
begin preparation to use this as a major base of operations for U.S. forces. (8)
On 3 February.
1945,.503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team was alerted for a parachute mission,
to capture NICHOLS AIRFIELD in the vicinity of MANILA; however, due to the rapid
advance of ground forces on LUZON, this mission was cancelled on 5 February. The
following day, the unit was again alerted, this time for the mission of seizing
and securing CORREGIDOR ISLAND. (9)
DISPOSITION AND GENERAL PLAN
The 503d
Parachute Regimental Combat Team was located at SAN JOSE, MINDORO where it had
been since the amphibious assault of 15 December 1944. (See Map A) The
regiment, at this time, was undergoing unit problems and keeping in shape for a
pending mission, which was always in the offing. Field Order Number 48, from
Sixth Army headquarters, was delivered 8 February to 503d RCT headquarters.(10}
In making the
plans for the assault, upon CORREGIDOR, the commander of the 'Rock Force'
(officer in charge of all units on the island of Corregidor, otherwise known as
"The Rook") had to take into consideration the topography of the island's
terrain. The 5th Airforce was called upon, to obtain photos Of CORREGIDOR, and a
topographic relief model of the island, made by a GHQ Engineer topographic unit,
was set up near Regimental headquarters and constantly remained under guard.
(11)
First, the
regimental staff, along with the battalion commanders, were briefed on all
points known, regarding the mission. Each battalion commander briefed his staff
and company commanders; and the latter, briefed company officers. A time
schedule was put into effect, whereby, each platoon leader could brief his
platoon, on all details pertaining to the operation. In this manner, every
officer and man was thoroughly indoctrinated as to the mission. (12)
At this time,
it is best to give a description of the island, The island is approximately one
square mile in area and is divided into two main sectors "Topside" and
"Bottomside". "Topside" -- on the western end of the island, is the highest
terrain feature. "Bottomside" -- is that portion of the island lying just west
of MALINTA HILL. (See Map C) MALINTA HILL rises to a height of 350 feet
and is the dominating terrain feature, on the eastern part of the island. The
island is bounded by sheer cliffs and in many places rise to 500 feet from the
waters edge. The only open terrain on the island is on "Topside", which
comprises the parade ground and the golf course.(13).
Aerial reconnaissance flights
were made, in order to make a close study of the island, for possible drop
areas. By studying the maps of the island and the results of flights, it was
disclosed there were three possible landing areas. Two possibilities were on
"Topside", which were the parade ground and the golf course.
The former was
approximately 250 yards by 150 yards, and the latter a little longer, but of the
same width as the parade ground. (l4)
Another
feasible drop area, was an unused emergency field, known as KINDLEY, towards the
tail of CORREGIDOR on the eastern end and just north of MONKEY POINT. (See
Map C) This was eliminated as a possible parachute landing zone, as it would
achieve nothing more than could be achieved by an amphibious assault. The
explanation of this was, if troops were dropped here, they would be exposed to
enemy fire from high ground at MONKEY HILL and MALINTA HILL; also, attack from
this area would have to move against heavily prepared positions. (15)
The decision
to drop on the parade ground and the golf course was made. The former was
designated as "Field A" and the latter designated as "Field B". Neither field
was or could be classified as an appropriate jumping field; besides, both were
too small to provide adequate space for landing. In addition, these areas were
littered with wreckage, bomb-craters and tree stumps. Another hazard which
presented itself, were the steep cliffs which bordered the drop zones. (16) The
two combined provided the smallest area into which an air drop of combat troops,
in any number, has yet been made. (17)
During this
preparatory phase, all officers and noncommissioned officers, who were to be
jumpmasters, made reconnaissance flights over the island in B-24's, which were
on their regular bomb run in this area. In this manner, each jumpmaster was able
to acquaint himself to some degree, with the terrain and to obtain a view of his
particular "go-point" (a distinguishing terrain feature used by the jumpmaster
as a guide). (18)
It was now
necessary to coordinate with the air and navy powers, in regards to softening up
the island, prior to the airborne assault. The air support phase of CORREGIDOR
had started on 23 January and by the day of the airborne assault, 16 February,
3,128 tons of bombs were dropped. (19)
CORREGIDOR was
subjected to the heaviest and most extensive aerial pounding, to which any area
of comparable size (less than one square mile) had been subjected during the
entire war in the Pacific. (20)
On the day of
the assault, continuous air pounding was set up to precede and cover the
parachute drop -- scheduled for 0830. An indication of air support, given the
morning of the drops was as follows: from 0745 to 0800, a group of heavy bombers
dropped 260 pound fragmentation bombs -- each plane carrying 40 bombs. After
0830, the support was confined to areas outside the drop zones and east of the
established 'bomb-line'; from 0830 to 0930, two groups of A-20's covered the
unrestricted areas. By this time, the 3d Battalion was to be on the ground, and
the air support was then limited to three squadrons of A-20's on the air alert;
one prepared to fly smoke missions on call, and the other two -- to support the
second parachute drop. (21)
The troop
carrying phase of the CORREGIDOR operation was accomplished by the 317th Troop
Carrier Group. (22) This same group, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John
Lackey, had carried the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment on previous missions,
and the parachute personnel were all glad that this group, again, was going to
put us out over the target. (23)
There were not
enough Carrier planes to fly the entire regiment over the target on one flight
-- therefore, the Rock Force Commander adopted a plan employing three lifts.
Each lift to include a Battalion Combat Team. This was necessary to ensure the
troops, on the ground, would have the support to continue operations, while the
remainder of the airborne forces were being dropped. In planning an airborne
operation, three major factors must be considered: (1) number of planes
available, (2) number of troops to be transported, (3) the distance from the
"take-off" point to the landing area. (24)
Within the
317th Troop Carrier Group were a total of 56 C-47's, .which were available. (25)
The first and second lifts were to be composed of 51 C-47's and the third lift
was to have 43 C-47's. Each lift was capable of dropping approximately 1,000
troops plus necessary bundles containing supplies and equipment, which could not
be carried by the individual soldiers. (26) In addition to the three lifts, 12
C-47's were allocated for daily resupply and as the situation came under
control, supplies were to come in by boat from MARIVELES. (27)
The first lift
was to take off at 0715 16 February from MINDORO and was to contain the 3d
Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, reinforced. The units to make up the
reinforcements were: Battery A and one platoon Battery D, the latter armed with
.50 Cal. HMG, were from the 462d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion; 3d
Platoon, Company C, 161st Airborne Engineer Company; Detachment Headquarters,
503d RCT and Detachment Headquarters, 462d Parachute Field Artillery. The second
lift was to take off at 1100 16 February, composed of 2d Battalion, reinforced.
The third lift was to take off at 0715 17 February, composed of the 1st
Battalion, reinforced. (28)
BATTALION PLAN FOR THE DROP
To utilize
the two small drop zones, it would be necessary for the planes to fly in column.
The decision to use column formation was caused by several factors, of which one
has already been mentioned -- the direction of wind and the velocity of same. In
formulation of the flight plan, it was decided to divide the planes into two
columns -- one column over each field. (See Map C) They were to come in
from the southwest, with the left column flying over Field A and the right
column flying over Field B. Eight men were to be dropped on each pass of the
plane and when this phase was completed, the planes would circle to the left
(left column) and right (right column) and swing around and join the tail of the
columns and continue as before until all twenty-four men (total in each plane)
had jumped. (29)
By flying and
jumping in column, to drop the entire Battalion would take approximately one
hour for the jump to be completed. When the pilot of each plane had reached the
"go-point", a green light would be turned on, indicating to the jumpmaster in
the rear of the plane, that they were over the "go-point" and he could jump at
anytime. Prevailing winds had made instructions necessary to every Jumpmaster,
to count three after passing his "go-point" and then jump his men. This
"go-point" had been decided upon in a conference between the troop carrier and
parachute staffs.
A control
plane was to be on station about the drop zones. This plane employed voice
radio, in the clear with the troop carriers, and was charged with the missions
of correcting the line of flight, or altering the count of the jumpmasters.
These factors based upon observation of parachutists already dropped. (30)
Jumping altitude was set at 1150 foot above sea level. The two drop zones were
550 feet above sea level -- therefore, the actual jumping altitude was 600 feet.
(31)
THE ENEMY SITUATION
Information
from higher intelligence estimated the enemy strength approximately 850;
however, no information was available as to his scheme of defense. Had the enemy
been prepared for a parachute assault, our troops would have met stiffer
resistance upon landing. (32) Later information received from a Japanese diary
and one of the few prisoner's of war, definitely stated that the Japanese
commander of all the forces upon the island, had been warned of the possibility
of an airborne assault. This intelligence information had been received from
higher headquarters, therefore, the commander made an estimate of the situation
and came to the conclusion that such an attack was not possible -- mainly, due
to the terrain. (33)
As later
confirmed, the enemy's strength was approximately 6,000. Of this number, half
were disposed on the defense perimeter of "The Rock" awaiting an amphibious
assault. The other half were located in and around the MALINTA HILL area. With
this situation in mind, it could be correctly assumed that the enemy was
adequately prepared for an amphibious assault, but, in all probability, would be
caught flat-footed by an airborne assault. (34)
Another
example as to what little our intelligence forces had, regarding the enemy on
CORREGIDOR, was the close comparison of installations on the island in recent
photos with photos of pre-war appearance -- clearly shows that little attempt
had been made to fortify during the Japanese occupation: The Japanese were
masters at camouflaging and this was another point in their favor relative to
concealment, as they had been clever in concealing the development of their
defensive organization. (35)
THE BATTALION PLAN OF ASSAULT
The line of
departure would be from ELMORE and HILL air-strips at SAN JOSE, MINDORO, 0715
hours 16 February 1940. (See Map A)
The flight
required about one hour and fifteen minutes for a distance of 140 miles from
MINDORO to CORREGIDOR: 3d Battalion was to commence dropping on the target at
Field A and Field B at 0830 hours, D plus 1. Both drop areas would be properly
secured, in order to give protection to the 2d Battalion coming in at 1215. A
perimeter was to be set up generally along the 500 foot contour line-of
"Topside". (See Map C) On D-Day, the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment
reinforced by 3d Platoon, AT Company and 3d Platoon, Cannon Company of the 34th
infantry Regiment would accompany 161st RCT when it entered the MARIVELES area;
however, the 3d would remain aboard landing craft in the MARIVELES area and make
the amphibious landing on CORREGIDOR, D plus 1, after the airborne assault had
started. (36) A bomb and strafing line was established and not to be crossed
before 1030 hours by 3d Battalion troops. (See Map C) The 3d Battalion
was to support by fire the amphibious landing of the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry
at 1030 hours and upon relief of the defensive perimeter by 2d Battalion, 503d
RCT, to drive eastward toward MALINTA HILL to effect contact with amphibious
troops. (37) Also, to advance and seize the high ground approximately 700 yards
northeast of the old hospital site (See Map C); and the commanding ground
about 1000 yards east of the hospital site. (See Map C) (38)
Battalion
headquarters, Headquarters Company and H Company were to drop on Field A.
Company G and Company I were to drop on Field B. (See Map C) As already
stated, each field would be secured to protect parachutists coming in the second
lift at 1215. The Battalion Command Post was to be the old lighthouse, which was
situated east of the parade grounds. (See Map C) Immediately, upon landing
and when the lighthouse was reached, battalion communication personnel would
start stringing wire to the "Topside" barracks, north of Field A, where
headquarters of the Rock Force was to be located. (See Map C) (39)
Each man
dropping on the target was to carry one unit of. ammunition on his person,
according to the type weapon he was armed with, four "K" rations plus two
canteens of water. Ammunition for the crew served weapons were to be dropped in
bundles. Medical aid men were to drop with their platoons and the Battalion Aid
Station was to be set up near the Battalion OP. A Portable Surgical Hospital
Unit was to come in amphibiously, after "Topside" was secured. This unit to be
under the supervision of regimental surgeon. (40)
Until the road
from the SAN JOSE landing beach to "Topside" was opened, supply plane called for
aerial drops. (See Map C) As mentioned in general situation, 12 C-47
planes were allotted for the supply missions.
MOVEMENT TO THE LINE OF DEPARTURE AND FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE ASSAULT
The battalion
had reveille at 0500 16 February. A good hot breakfast was served by each of the
companies kitchens. Last minute check-up of ammunition, and fitting of the
parachute was done by every parachutist. Trucks pulled into the battalion area
and moved out with loaded personnel for the airstrips, ELMORE and HILL at 0630.
Take off time was 0715 and the personnel loaded aboard the planes at 0700. Each
plane's para-racks (equipment holders under the fuselage) were loaded with
artillery containers or ammunition containers. The lead plane started down the
runway at 0715 with the other planes following suit. They rendezvoused above
MINDORO and then started northward following the coast line towards their
objective. Approximately six-miles out from the objective, the planes began to
fall into their respective flight columns - one for Field A and one for Field B.
(See Map C) (41)
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